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Overview 
Computers are important in every aspect of modern life. Automatic tabulating 
machines are designed to be the most consistent and reliable counting approach 
invented.  Still, questions of reliability, security and auditablity persist. Ken 
Thompson and others have shown that, like other carelessly composed processes, 
computer programs can harbor potentially criminal activity. To be useful for 
voting, software must simplify and improve the ability to record and report 
intentions.  
Best practices must be used in creating important software to guard against bugs 
and malware. In spite of the fact that malware can be hidden in any program, there 
are ways to assure that it is not impacting the operation of the software. First, test 
vectors must allow testing of the software in every conceivable situation. Second, 
demonstrations can be arranged to show that it is running correctly when it is 
actually used. Third, computers can produce multiple records to assure that it has 
performed correctly.   
Electronic Registration Software . 
Registration databases are thought to be the greatest loss of votes in the system.  
Registration databases are cleaned, updated and deployed with inadequate controls. 
Improvements to certifying this process could save 1 to 2 % of US votes. 
Electronic Voting Machines  
Electronic voting machines are used in many parts of the world to collect votes.  
They can be used to protect the ballot box from many kinds of stuffing, stealing 
and vandalism. They can be used to give voting independence to people with 
physical, perceptual, and cognitive special needs. They can simplify voting with 
multiple languages or illiteracy. 
Improvements to certifying this software must also improve ballots which could 
save least 1% of US votes. 
 
Backend Tally Counting Systems 
The tally and election certification process has embraced software for years. Even 
with software, many cases of one person changing the tallies have been reported. 
Certification Goals 
Many opportunities are available to make and certify software to increase the 
ability for election results to reflect voter intentions.  Computer experts’ part of the 
certification process has to have teeth but not increase probabilities of problems.   
Open systems can allow public vetting; it also allows criminals to study and plot 
against potential weaknesses.  Qualification processes for writers of crucial 
software are possible. Legacy systems cobbled together over years are potentially 
are thoroughly tested yet full of bugs.  Finally, systems can be built and tested that 
give internal oversight of software.  We have created demonstration N-Version 
software to avoid any single point of failure.   
While code reads can find problems, in the end, good software is theoretically 
problematic and testing is crucial.  Test vectors in voting will include and require 
more than a program that runs through the steps of the process.  Testing voting 
software will require defense-in-depth approaches. All voting software components 
must be shown to improve acquisition, retention, and reporting of voter intention 
over systems it replaces. This means that the software and processes around it must 
be vetted.  Today’s computers allow adjustment of their time clocks.  While a 
potential source of problems itself, this can be used to test for fraud.  Setting the 
time to the beginning of an election, the actual situation of an election can be 
simulated to demonstrate built-in software fraud.  Parallel testing can be done on 
the day of elections in which phantom precincts are voted, carefully demonstrating 
any systematic software reason that the election shouldn’t be certified. 
The clear separation and dependence on computer tasks has been made obvious in 
voting.  Internal or external verification of the correctness of voting software 
actions seems important. External verification of software’s correct handling of 
votes can be accomplished by video or audio transcripts, which do not add 
complex cognitive tasks for voters. End-to-end demonstration of vote deposit for 
voters is another goal. Voting software certification will be process in which 
testing and practices will continue to develop, hopefully to be useful for 
improvement of all  human-computer systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
